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Abstract
Approved client-server authentication mechanisms are described for the IVOA 
single-sign-on profile: digital signatures (for SOAP services); TLS with passwords 
(for user sign-on points); TLS with client certificates (for everything else). 
Normative rules are given for the implementation of these mechanisms, mainly 
by reference to pre-existing standards.
Status of This Document
This document has been produced by the IVOA Grid and Web Services Working 
Group.
It has been reviewed by IVOA Members and other interested parties, and has 
been endorsed by the IVOA Executive Committee as an IVOA Recommendation. 
It is a stable document and may be used as reference material or cited as a 
normative reference from another document. IVOA's role in making the 
Recommendation is to draw attention to the specification and to promote its 
widespread deployment. This enhances the functionality and interoperability 
inside the Astronomical Community.
A list of current IVOA Recommendations and other technical documents can be 
found at http://www.ivoa.net/Documents/. 
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Definitions
The Virtual Observatory (VO) is general term for a collection of federated 
resources that can be used to conduct astronomical research, education, and 
outreach. The International Virtual Observatory Alliance (IVOA) is a global 
collaboration of separately funded projects to develop standards and 
infrastructure that enable VO applications. The International Virtual 
Observatory (IVO) application is an application that takes advantage of IVOA 
standards and infrastructure to provide some VO service.
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1 Introduction
IVOA’s single-sign-on architecture is a system in which users assign 
cryptographic credentials to user agents so that the agents may act with the 
user’s identity and access rights. This standard describes how agents use those 
credentials to authenticate the user’s identity in requests to services.
This document is essentially a profile against existing security standards; that is, 
it describes how an existing standard should be applied in an IVO application to 
support single sign-on capabilities in the IVO. In the following sections, we make 
specific references to details spelled out in these standards. For the purposes of 
validating against this standard, those referenced documents should be 
consulted for a full explanation of those details. Unfortunately, a reader that is 
unfamiliar with these external standards might find this specification confusing. 
To alleviate this problem, each major section is concluded by a Commentary 
subsection that provides some explanations of the detailed terms and concepts 
being referred to. The Commentary subsection may also provide recommended 
scenarios for how this specification might actually be realized. Note that the 
statements in the Commentary subsections are non-normative and should not be 
considered part of precise specification; nevertheless, they are indicative of the 
intended spirit of this document.
2 Scope of this standard
2.1 Requirements
When a service is registered in an IVO registry, that service’s resource document 
may include metadata expressing conformance to one or more of the 
authentication mechanisms approved in the IVOA SSO profile. Such a service 
must implement those mechanisms as described in this document, and clients of 
the service must participate in the mechanism when calling the service.
The registration of the service interface shall contain an XML element of type 
SecurityMethod as specified in the XML schema for VOResource [VOResource]. 
The value of this element distinguished the authentication mechanism using the 
values stated in the sections below.
Services registered without the metadata alluded to above need not support any 
authentication mechanism. If they do require authentication, they may use either 
the IVOA-standard mechanisms or others that are not IVOA standards.
2.2 Commentary
The IVOA SSO profile allows the development of a “realm” of interoperable 
services and clients. Service providers opt in to this realm by implementing this 
current standard and by registering accordingly in the IVO registry. This allows 
clients to discover a secured service through the registry and to be able to use it 
without being customized for the details of the specific service.
Parts of the IVO that are not intended to be widely interoperable need not opt in 
to the SSO realm. In particular, “private” services, accessed by web browsers 
and protected by passwords, are allowed. However, these private services 
should be reworked to follow the IVOA standard if they are later promoted to a 
wider audience.
An example of a registration for a secured interface follows.
<interface xmlns:vs:=”ivo://www.ivoa.net/xml/VODataService/v1.0”
           xsi:type=”vs:ParamHTTP”>
  <accessURL>http://some.where/some/thing</accessURL>
  <securityMethod>ivo://ivoa.net/sso/tls-with-certificate</securityMethod>
</interface>
3 Approved authentication mechanisms
3.1 Requirements
The following authentication mechanisms are approved for use in the SSO 
profile.
 No authentication required.
 Digital signature of messages.
 Transport Layer Security (TLS) with client certificates.
 Transport Layer Security (TLS) with passwords.
The mechanism is associated with the interface provided by the service and 
registered in the IVO registry.
 Services that are registered with a VO registry as having a WebService type 
interface [VOResource] shall support digital signature, or shall support TLS 
with client certificates or shall require no authentication.
 Interfaces by which a user logs in to the SSO system shall support either TLS 
with client certificates, or TLS with passwords, or both.
 All other interfaces shall support TLS with client certificates or shall require no 
authentication.
3.2 Commentary
Services with interface type WebService are SOAP services.
Digital signatures on messages are preferred as (a) they protect the message 
through a chain of handlers and (b) they avoid the need, in conventional TLS, to 
certify the service. However, most message formats have nowhere to convey a 
signature. The envelope structure in SOAP, consisting of a message body and 
separate header, is ideally suited to carrying signatures.
The digital-signature and TLS-with-client-certificate mechanisms allow the 
service to verify that the client holds the private key matching a certificate 
transmitted with the message. Authentication succeeds if the service trusts the 
issuer of the certificate. That trust is determined by reference to a set of 
certificates for trusted certificate authorities (CAs) configured into the service by 
the service provider. 
4 Details of TLS
4.1 Requirements
Services using Transport Layer Security (TLS) shall do so according to the TLS 
v1.0 standard [RFC2246].
4.2 Commentary
TLS is derived from the earlier standard known as Secure Sockets Layer of 
which versions 2.0 and 3.0 are in use at the time of writing. TLS v1.0 is based on 
SSL v3.0; “the differences between [TLS v1.0] and SSL 3.0 are not dramatic, but 
they are significant enough that TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 do not interoperate 
(although TLS 1.0 does incorporate a mechanism by which a TLS 
implementation can back down to SSL 3.0)” [RFC2246]. SSL v2.0 has known 
flaws that compromise its security.
5 Details of TLS-with-client-certificate
5.1 Requirements
Certificates shall be transmitted and checked according to the TLS v1.0 standard 
[RFC2246].
Services implementing TLS must support certificate chains including proxy 
certificates according to RFC3820 [RFC3820].
Interfaces using this mechanism shall be be registered with the security method 
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#tls-with-client-certificate.
6 Details of TLS-with-password
6.1 Requirements
The user-name and password shall be passed in the message protected by the 
TLS mechanism, not as part of the mechanism itself. In particular, “HTTP basic 
authentication” shall not be used.
Interfaces using this mechanism shall be be registered with the security method 
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#tls-with-password.
6.2 Commentary
“HTTP basic authentication” passes the user-name and password in the HTTP 
headers, assuming that the credentials are not a natural part of the message 
body. This standard applies the TLS-with-Password mechanism only to the 
special case of logging in to the SSO realm. Hence, the user name and 
password are logically part of the message body, not the message header.
7 Details of digital signature
7.1 Requirements
SOAP clients shall sign digitally the entire body of a SOAP request message and 
shall send the signature to the SOAP service as part of the message. The 
signature shall be encoded in the SOAP header according to the rules of the WS-
Security standard [WS-Security].
The client shall sign messages using a certificate chain as described in section 8 
of this document. This chain shall be included in the SOAP header as an element 
of type BinarySecurityToken (as defined in [WS-Security], section 6.3) The 
signature in the SOAP header shall refer to this BinarySecurityToken by including 
a suitable SecurityTokenReference (as defined in [WS-Securtity], section 7.1) in 
the signature.
The service shall authenticate the sender of a signed message in a two-step 
process:
1. validate the signature on the message body;
2. reconstitute and validate a chain of certificates leading from the certificate 
associated with the message signature back to a trust anchor (see below) 
trusted implicitly by the service.
The rules for validating the signature are given in the WS-Security standard and 
in standards referred by WS-Security. The rules for validating the chain of trust 
are described in section 8 of this document. 
Interfaces using this mechanism shall be be registered with the security method 
ivo://ivoa.net/sso#soap-digital-signature.
7.2 Commentary
A trust anchor is a self-signed certificate that the application trusts as being 
authentic. This is usually because the certificate was obtained by the application 
via a different channel (usually explicitly by the application’s administrator) than 
the channel connecting the service and the client. See section 8.2 for more 
discussion of the role of a trust anchor.
WS-Security, in respect of digital signatures, is mainly a set of rules for 
organizing the XML elements defined by IETF digital-signature standard 
[RFC3275]. The IETF standard is very general; WS-Security “blesses” a few of 
the possible patterns of usage. This profile in turn “blesses” a few of the possible 
uses of WS-Security. 
There are two extant versions of WS-Security, v1.0 and v1.1. These versions 
specify the same XML for a signed message, so the question of which version to 
support is not important.
8 Certificate chains
8.1 Requirements
The certificate chain sent by a client to a service during authentication shall 
contain only end-entity certificates [RFC2459] and proxy certificates [RFC3820]; 
both are forms of the X.509v3 certificate format. The transmitted chain shall not 
include any self-signed certificates. The identity which the client wishes 
authenticated must be the subject of the first end-entity certificate in the chain.
For the purpose of establishing trust, the service shall be configured with one or 
more chains of certificates each of which ends with a trust anchor (see section 
8.2). These configured chains must contain only end-entity certificates.
To establish trust in the identity with which a message is signed, a service shall 
concatenate the chain transmitted by the client with one of the configured chains, 
forming a single chain from the certificate used in the message signature back to 
the trust anchor. The service shall then validate the relationship between each 
two links in the chain according to the IETF rules [RFC3820].
A certificate may contain a limit on the length of the chain of proxy certificates 
that may be derived from it. The validation of the certificate chain shall respect 
this limit if it is present.
If the chain is validated successfully, then the service shall deem the chain to 
authenticate the identity that is the subject of the first end-entity certificate in the 
chain.
8.2 Commentary
In a chain of certificates, each certificate is signed by the certificate that comes 
after it, or is self-signed. Self-signed certificates trusted by the service are called 
“trust anchors”; they are generally certificates issued by certificate authorities 
(CAs). End-entity certificates are issued on behalf of users (humans or automata) 
by CAs and are often “permanent” – that is, they have a long lifetime. Proxy 
certificates are usually short-term credentials (valid typically for a few hours or 
days).
Proxy certificates are often used to solve two problems. The first is that a user 
may authenticate herself using a long lived EEC; however, it would not be safe to 
allow an application to have long-term use of that certificate, particularly if that 
application is remote. To solve this, a short-lived proxy certificate can be provided 
to the application to limit its privileges. Note that in some authentication models, 
the user can authenticate with a delegation service which can provide the 
application with a certificate. This can be either a short-lived proxy or a short-
lived EEC; either will solve the problem.
The other problem is that one service requiring authentication will need to call 
another service requiring authentication. Solving this problem in the IVOA SSO 
framework requires the use of proxy certificates. Below is a scenario for how this 
can be accomplished. 
A user agent signs on to the SSO system (the details of the sign-on process are 
not specified in this document) in a user’s name and receives a chain of two 
certificates: a proxy and an end-entity certificate. The user-agent holds the 
private key matching the proxy certificate but not that matching the end-entity 
certificate. The agent signs messages with the proxy and includes in the 
message the end-entity certificate in order to complete the chain back to the CA 
certificate that is the trust anchor.
When service B receives an authenticated request from agent A (signed with a 
proxy certificate), and when makes an authenticated call to service C while 
satisfying A’s request, then B derives from A’s proxy a new proxy to which B 
holds the private key (the protocol for deriving this proxy is specified outside this 
document). This new proxy is signed using A’s original proxy. Therefore, C 
receives a chain of two proxy certificates and one end-entity certificate. If C then 
calls service D, C sends a chain of three proxies and one end-entity certificate.
Some of the chain-validation rules from RFC3820 can be summarized as follows 
(this is an incomplete description of the rules and is non-normative for the IVOA 
SSO profile).
 A proxy certificate may be followed by an end-entity certificate or another 
proxy certificate.
 An end-entity certificate may not be followed by a proxy certificate.
 There must be exactly one self-signed certificate and it must be the last in 
the chain: this is the trust anchor.
 Any proxy certificate must carry the ProxyCertInfo extension (and must 
therefore be in X.509v3 format).
 Any end-entity certificate that follows another end-entity certificate must 
carry the basic-constraints extension with the CA field set to true (and 
must therefore be in X.509v3 format).
 There must be at most one end-entity certificate that does not have the CA 
field in the basic-constraints extension set to true. This must be the first 
end-entity certificate in the chain.
9 Changes since previous version of this document
 All references to “identity certificate” (a Globus term) are changed to “end-
entity certificate” (an IETF term defined in RFC3820).
 The form of registration for secured interfaces is specified.
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